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Gerken: Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance

KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
LOBBYING AS THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Heather Gerken *
NOVEMBER 12, 2011
Thank you very much for having me. The conference organizers
asked me to provide you with a little food for thought to go along
with the more traditional sustenance that they’ve provided. I may
repeat a few things said in the earlier panels. This will be short and
sweet, in large part because I left my house this morning at 3:45 A.M.
and the caffeine runs out in about twenty-five minutes.
I want to talk a little bit about the future of campaign finance
reform and the future of campaign finance scholarship in the wake of
Citizens United. Here I am going to draw upon my own work and the
work of some of the folks in this room, including Richard Briffault
and Rick Hasen, so please imagine a properly footnoted law review
article scrolling behind me.
I want to make three points. First, I will argue that Citizens United
has cut off most of the traditional pathways for campaign finance
reform. Second, I want to talk about the new directions in which this
development will push us; I will talk very briefly about future reform
proposals in the campaign finance context, some of which we have
already talked about today. Finally, I will talk about where I think
campaign finance should go. Here I’ll argue that, just as brown is the
new black, lobbying is the new campaign finance. I want to talk a
little bit about why I think these two areas are going to be tied closely
together in practice and in theory. I’ll even kick in new a policy
proposal at the end by way of a party favor: a public finance analog
for lobbying reform.

* What follows is a modestly edited transcript of Professor Gerken’s speech.
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A. The Dead End for Reform: Taking Money Out of Politics
Let me start with the basic premise of campaign finance reform
and why I think we may be leaving it behind. The instinct that has
long undergirded campaign finance reform is to get money out of
politics. It’s a perfectly sensible idea if you think that money distorts
political incentives. By that I simply mean that money makes
politicians pay less attention to average, everyday people and more
attention to wealthy corporate interests. While I subscribe to this
perfectly sensible idea, I get off the boat when reformers start to
make a list of the problems that they associate with money, including
thirty-second advertisements, special interest groups, and the end of
deliberation. These lists lead me to suspect that some reform
supporters just don’t like democracy. What bothers them is not
money in democracy—it is democracy in democracy. But even if you
like politics and think elections are ugly and kind of fantastic, you
can still get on board with the idea that money can distort political
incentives.
Whatever you think about the goal of taking money out of politics,
Citizens United provides the latest, and perhaps the best, evidence
that this goal is a dead end for reform, at least in the short term.
While it may be possible to hold onto what exists now (contribution
limits in particular), reformers are not going to be able to build a new
McCain-Feingold regime, let alone find more muscular ways to take
money out of politics, without running headlong into an exceedingly
skeptical Supreme Court. While I think that McCain-Feingold was
overall a good development, I think we should admit that the results
of the “take money out of politics” approach have been
underwhelming. That is not to say that it is theoretically impossible to
take money out of politics. But in a system like ours—where
elections are privately funded, where reform is piecemeal, and where
public finance is generally not a realistic option—money hasn’t been
taken out of politics. Donors simply find new, less transparent ways
to gain influence in the process. Whether you blame that on Buckley
v. Valeo (the field’s first blockbuster case) or Citizens United, there is
no place to go.
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When academics teach students about the history of campaign
finance, they always start with Buckley. It is the snake in the garden
of campaign finance Eden. The story we tell is that when the Court
drew a distinction between expenditures and contributions, it created
a world in which politicians’ appetite for money would be limitless,
but their ability to get that money would not be. Political interests
inevitably looked for loopholes, they inevitably found loopholes, and
they inevitably drove big trucks of money through those loopholes.
As a result, the entire reform game became focused on closing those
loopholes—engaging in the regulatory equivalent of whack-a-mole.
Either money gets driven into dark corners, where it is hard to track,
or efforts to regulate start to tread on First Amendment interests—
interests that would be salient even to someone who thinks that much
of campaign finance regulation is constitutional.
Now, others will say that it is not Buckley v. Valeo that is the
problem; it is what the current Court has been doing of late. On this
view, McCain-Feingold was going to work and in the long term we
would have been able to close most of the loopholes. Here I do think
that reformers have a point—although it is not the point that they are
constantly flogging with the press. Every time you see reformers up
in front of the press, they say that Citizens United unleashed the
floodgates of corporate money, that the Supreme Court’s overruling
of Austin—which is the one case where the Supreme Court invoked
the equality rational in talking about campaign finance—was the end
of the world. Here I am with some of the earlier folks on the panel.
I’m a little skeptical that the ruling on independent corporate
expenditures is the end of the world. I do think that transparency is
important, and I would like to see some efforts to fix that problem.
But we don’t really know whether Citizens United has opened the
corporate floodgates. And I certainly would have to agree with one of
the earlier panelists that the parties will find a way to even things out.
I would be stunned if the Democrats don’t catch up substantially on
this front next year.
I do think that Citizens United will be seen as a pivotal point in
campaign finance, however, because of what it said about the
corruption rational—a point that Richard Briffault talked about
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earlier and that I’ve written about in the past. As we all know, when
Congress regulates in this area, the Constitution requires it to have a
good reason in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny. Citizens
United seems to have dramatically cut back on what constitutes a
good reason for regulation. That is because it substantially narrowed
the definition of corruption, the rationale that is regularly invoked
when Congress wants to pass reform. Indeed, while reformers have
mourned the court’s rejection of Austin and the equality rational, in
my view the most important line in Citizens United was not the one
overruling Austin. It is this one: “Ingratiation and access are not
corruption.”
For many years before Citizens United, the liberals on the Court
had gradually expanded the corruption rational to extend well beyond
quid pro quo corruption (I give you dollars, you give me votes). The
Court had licensed Congress to regulate even when the threat was
simply that large donors had better access to politicians or that
politicians seemed to be too compliant with their wishes. At times,
the Court even went so far as to say that regulation could be premised
even on the perception of undue influence or the “cynical assumption
that large donors called the tune.” That was enough to justify
regulation before Citizens United. Ingratiation and access were
corruption, as far as the Court was concerned. This extremely broad
definition of corruption was very easy to satisfy and very easy to
invoke when regulating campaign finance. What this meant in
practice was that you could get almost everything you wanted in the
campaign finance world without having to invoke Austin, without
having to use the word equality. Congress need only rely on concerns
about corruption.
But Justice Kennedy is not a fool. He was well aware of what his
colleagues on the Court were doing with the corruption rational, and
he did everything he could in Citizens United to put a stop to it.
Kennedy did not say that the Court was overruling these cases, but I
think under a fair reading of the cases it was. In my view, that part of
the opinion doesn’t just raise questions about regulations on
independent corporate expenditures; it raises questions about lots of
other types of campaign finance regulation, as has been made clear
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by the lower court decisions that have followed in the wake of
Citizens United. Richard Briffault has talked about the soft money
ban. I, too, am a little bit worried that Citizens United might put the
soft money ban in jeopardy. At the very least, though, I think it is fair
to say that Citizens United’s ruling on corruption means that it will be
very hard to pass much more legislation that pursues the traditional
goal in campaign finance: taking money out of politics.
B. New Directions in Campaign Finance Reform
So, where do we go from here now that it is clear that the
traditional paths of reform are blocked? You might just throw in the
towel. But the two groups who care most about reform tend to be
academics (who are paid for life, so we will just keep writing about
this stuff) and reformers. Reformers are the world’s biggest optimists.
They have to be, because election reform is the hardest kind of
reform. Reformers have to convince people that process shapes
substance. It is incredibly hard to do and, worst of all, the people you
are trying to convince are usually self-interested politicians. The odd
thing about election reform is that the people who know the most
about reform, who care the most about reform, are the politicians
who oppose the reform and have the power not to pass it.
So, what are reformers and academics going to do in the wake of
Citizens United? Rather than focusing on taking money out of
politics, it seems to me that pragmatic reformers and academics will
move in new directions. The most promising avenues will involve
thinking about reform in a different way. That is, rather than trying to
resist existing political incentives, maybe it is time to figure out how
to harness them. Harnessing politics to fix politics would require us
to recognize that money will always be part of the system and to use
money’s attractions to create the right kind of incentives for
politicians. The obvious and popular example of this strategy is
matching rules, which take a twenty dollar donation and turn it into,
say, a hundred or two hundred dollar donation. While campaign
finance has always tried to level down by restricting the ability of
moneyed interests to influence the process, matching rules try to level
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up by making small donations and small donors worth more in the
eyes of politicians. They give politicians a reason to reach out to
middle-class and working-class voters. That strikes me as the right
kind of way to think about incentives.
Disclosure and disclaimer rules are also a way of harnessing
politics to fix politics. Even if we can’t pull money out of politics,
perhaps we can make it visible in a way that improves our politics. I
take seriously Richard Briffault’s skepticism about disclosure rules
that focus on small donors, which may provide too much information
at too high a price (a point he makes in an unpublished paper entitled
“Campaign Finance 2.0”). But here I have in mind the kind of
disclosure rules that would trace large donations and large
expenditures. Consider a rule that would require any political
advertisement to identify the top donors for the advertisement. You
can see that this type of reform works with political incentives, not
against them. Having big business on your side is usually an
advantage in an election. But having big business on your side is not
an advantage in a campaign advertisement. That’s because big
business types may be the only people who are less popular than
politicians themselves.
We all know why shortcuts like disclaimers matter; we are familiar
with the problem of the low-information voter. We all know that
voters do not know a huge amount about the fine-grained details of
policy proposals. So what do they do? They rely on shortcuts—like
the words “Democrat” or “Republican”—which stand in, in a pretty
sensible way, for a larger set of policy positions. Shortcuts are what
enable voters to make sensible policy decisions when they vote. And
disclaimers and disclosures are shortcuts. They offer a signal to the
voter about how to process the information in question. As I said, the
American people do not have that much affection for American
companies. An advertisement that is very helpful when it is run by
the Coalition for Clean Energy or the Workplace Safety Consortium
is not likely to be as helpful when it is sponsored by British
Petroleum or Massey Coal.
One of today’s earlier speakers said that, in his view, oil
companies had an expressive interest: a First Amendment right to
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send out these ads secretly and not to be held accountable for what
they say. That seems inconsistent with what eight justices on the
Supreme Court think that the First Amendment requires. The way
that the First Amendment works is that people get to push back if you
say something with which they disagree. It is one thing to say that if
there is a threat of violence—if someone is going to slash your
company’s trucks’ tires or throw a brick through your store
windows—that you are entitled not to have your expenditures
disclosed. But it’s not clear that it’s a cognizable injury under the
First Amendment if someone stops buying your company’s product.
I should say that neither of the ideas that I have talked about thus
far are new in the world of campaign finance. But I do think it is fair
to say that, although there has been a small minority of reformers that
do work in this direction, mostly these have not been the dominant
way of thinking about reform. In the wake of Citizens United,
however, these strategies will not just be the dominant game, they
may be the only game in town (at least until the personnel on the
Supreme Court changes).
C. Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance
If one future direction for reform is to think about channeling
money in useful political directions rather than trying to pull it out of
the system entirely, the other may be lobbying. Let me just say a few
words about why I think that lobbying may be the new campaign
finance.
Lobbying is strangely neglected by election law scholars. We don’t
actually write much about lobbying. There is a small and varied
group doing it, but the subject is largely neglected by the field. Most
people in the field write regularly about districting, campaign
finance, and the like, but most of us—myself included—have not said
a word about lobbying. I can’t remember the last time I saw a
lobbying panel at an election law conference. It doesn’t even appear
in one of the two major textbooks that we use to teach our students,
although Rick Hasen, I am sure, would like me to mention that his
text book mentions it. I think Richard Briffault may be the only one
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in our field who has written in depth about the relationship between
the two areas (in an excellent article in the Stanford Law Review).
What’s strange about election law’s neglect of lobbying is that the
relationship between the two is so close in the real world. Lobbying
and campaign finance work in tandem with one another as interests
seek political influence. We neglect lobbying even though we
routinely repeat the mantra, made famous by Sam Issacharoff and
Pam Karlan, that “money is a hydraulic force and it will always find
an outlet.”
I myself prefer the way Michael Kang formulates this problem in a
piece in the Iowa Law Review. There he argues that it’s politics that
exercises a hydraulic force. Money is just a visible symptom of the
hydraulics of political influence. If we think about campaign finance
in these terms, it is hard to imagine why anyone would neglect
lobbying. It is the other natural means of seeking political influence.
As long as lobbying and campaign finance work in tandem with one
another, we should not study one without studying the other. Both are
simply different means to achieve the same set of political ends. They
are not isolated systems that are separate from one another.
Why, then, do election law scholars spend an inordinate amount of
time writing about campaign finance, but not lobbying? It can’t be
because lobbying is not important. We are all familiar with the ability
of lobbyists to put loopholes into a bill and to soften regulation
behind the scenes. The market, at least, confirms the importance of
lobbying. For example, federal reports suggest that federal spending
on lobbying in 2008 was 3.47 billion dollars—which, you will note,
was more than the 3.2 billion campaign dollars spent in what was a
record-breaking election season in 2008. If that doesn’t give you a
sense of where the smart money goes, I don’t know what will.
We also can’t explain the neglect of lobbying by asserting that the
subject isn’t interesting. Indeed, I would argue that it raises exactly
the same kinds of conceptual questions as does campaign finance.
Election law is a field that takes the pristine principals of
constitutional law—the First Amendment, Equal Protection—and
throws them into the down-and-dirty world of politics. Lobbying fits
perfectly in such a field.
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Although lobbying and campaign finance do look to different
kinds of questions, there are many important similarities. Both
campaign finance and lobbying regulations are designed to deal with
the problem of political influence. Both involve similar regulatory
challenges. It is not just that both regimes raise serious constitutional
questions, as the First Amendment looms large in both areas. Both
require us to regulate a shape shifter. In his Iowa Law Review piece,
Michael Kang has pointed out that in politics we are rarely regulating
stable legal entities. Instead, what we are trying to regulate is really
just a loose collection of interests that can take different forms as
circumstances dictate. Each time the courts and the legislature try to
regulate one kind of political institution, political entrepreneurs find a
new way to recreate that institution. Party donors become supporters
of 527s, and then supporters of 527s become supporters of 501(c)(4)s
and 501(c)(6)s. You can just see where the trail of money goes as the
same interests take on different forms. The same thing happens in
lobbying. When Congress and Obama put some modest lobby reform
in place, a bunch of lobbyists just deregistered. They are shape
shifters. We see it in campaign finance, and we see it in lobbying.
Maybe the reason we neglect lobbying is that, while the problems
are the same, the plausible solutions are not. As Richard Briffault has
argued in the Stanford Law Review, campaign finance reform has
long had a strong egalitarian element to it; we have long tried to
imagine campaign finance as having an equalizing influence. This is
not what we do in lobbying. We do not try to ensure that every
American gets a lobbyist. Lobbying reform, then, focuses almost
entirely on questions of disclosure and transparency.
I think that Richard’s description is correct in describing what we
have seen so far. But he wrote that piece before Citizens United. I
think that by the time the Court is done with its work in campaign
finance, his observation may not apply anymore. It may be that,
going forward, most of the work on campaign finance will also be
largely confined to disclosure and transparency. The regulatory
questions will then look even more alike than they do now.
In fact, we may be there already. After all, the justifications for
disclosure rules now focus less on the need for congressional
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representatives to know what is going on with lobbyists—the old
rational for lobbying—and more on the kind of public-oriented
justifications that we see in campaign finance. Maybe the
convergence has already occurred.
The last reason we haven’t written about lobbying may be that
there is nothing left to say. I just think that cannot be right. No
academic ever thinks that there is nothing left to say. At the very least
we can repeat things that other people have said. To be sure, in the
lobbying context, we don’t have what is a great gift to academics—
the annual release of a badly written Supreme Court decision to kick
around. The Supreme Court gives us lots to write about every year.
But surely we don’t need the Supreme Court to signal that something
is important.
Moreover, lobbying plays to the strengths of the field. We spend a
lot of time thinking about structural problems like this. We spend a
lot of time thinking about how to translate those pristine principals of
constitutional law into the down-and-dirty realm of politics. We are
comfortable with the dilemmas of regulation in this area. We already
know what happens when foxes guard the henhouse—when you have
to ask self-interested politicians to reform themselves. We know
about the risk that partisans will use their public power as legislators
to pursue private interests—the risk that they will wage war with the
other party or even within their own party, all the while calling it
reform. We also know about the risks involved when partisans don’t
use regulation as a partisan weapon—when all the incumbents can
agree that what is good for incumbents is good for the world. Indeed,
the reason that we have bipartisan gerrymanders, where everyone
gets protected, is probably similar to the reasons why we don’t have a
lot of work on the lobbying front: the one thing that politicians can
always agree on is preserving the status quo.
As I noted before, we are all aware of the challenges involved in
regulating shape shifters like political parties, special interest groups,
or lobbyists. We might even imagine pursuing similar solutions in
these areas of the law. I think this is especially true as disclosure and
disclaimer rules take on an increasingly prominent role in campaign
finance. It may be that we can learn something from developments in
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the lobbying context in thinking about disclosures and disclaimers in
campaign finance and vice versa.
Let me just give you two examples. Bruce Cain has already offered
one such lesson in an edited volume entitled Race, Reform, and
Regulation of the Electoral Process. There he draws on the lessons of
campaign finance and makes a suggestion about lobbying reform. He
says that the usual move for lobbying reform is to give the lobbyists
who represent moneyed interests less voice. It is a solution that levels
things down. Cain says that the solution may be to give people more
voice, to pull people up. It is exactly the kind of solution you see for
campaign donation matching rules—to give people who are neglected
more power. Cain suggests that if you are a public interest group that
meets a certain membership requirement, then your guys will
automatically become lobbyists and be allowed to work on bills in
Congress.
D. The Lobbying Analog to Public Finance
I want to pitch another idea. This one is at such an early stage that
I am a bit nervous about doing it, but my co-author Alex
Tausanovitch and I are in the midst of writing it up. The idea is in the
“does this dog hunt?” stage—our question is whether this article
writes.
Alex and I have been trying to imagine the public finance analog to
lobbying. Our paper begins with a simple question: what exactly is it
that congressional representatives and legislators get from lobbyists?
Most assume it’s money. That is where most of the energy in
lobbying reform goes, so most people worry about the lobbyists who
bundle. But, as Richard Briffault has pointed out, that is not really the
problem. Lobbyists are just channeling special interest money. It is
not the lobbyists’ own money or even the elicit steak dinners and
baseball tickets that we worry most about. The money we really
worry about is the money donated by special interest groups. On this
view, the real problem is the special interest groups, not the lobbyists
who bundle for them.
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But lobbyists do more for legislators than just channel money.
They provide information. Indeed, some believe that the informationproviding function is more important than the money providing
function. According to political scientists, there are three kinds of
things that lobbyists will give you: (1) political information (how
likely is it that this legislation will pass?); (2) electoral information (if
you vote for this bill, is your constituency going to vote you out the
next time around?); and (3) policy information (what happens when
we pass this bill and is there any alternative?).
How does it work? Because lobbyists can give politicians these
three crucial kinds of information, they can move their bills forward
more quickly than bills where this information is not provided. Think
of it this way: if you are a member of Congress trying to determine
what bills to pass in the limited time that you have, you will probably
pass the bills for which you have all of the information that you need
to pass—where you don’t have to figure out what to do to get the
legislation drafted.
Put differently, legislators will take the prefab option. The
lobbyists provide McLegislation, McTalking Points, and the
McResearch neatly packaged in a nice bag, along with the equivalent
of a Happy Meal toy—the all-too-helpful polling research that will
tell you how things will go in the future. What would you do? You
would take the McDonalds option. You would take the prefab option.
Richard Hall and Alan Deardoff call the help lobbyists provide a
“legislative subsidy.” They say that subsidy often explains why bills
move forward.
So, here is the public finance analog. It is very difficult to
eliminate legislative subsidies; you would run into huge First
Amendment problems if you tried to stop lobbying of this sort. But
you can imagine leveling up. You can imagine providing a legislative
subsidy for those issues where well-heeled lobbyists aren’t there to
provide that helping hand—where staffers and bosses need the
McLegislation, the McResearch and McTalking Points, but they
don’t have them because the well-funded interests are not there to
provide them.
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There are lots of ways to level up. You could just tell Congress to
hire more staffers. While that sounds like a great option for
congressional representatives, you can just imagine the problem.
Staffers are fungible, and congressional members could just take that
money and put it into more support for constituent services and the
like. Moreover, the problem with added staffers is that they are not
guaranteed to be experts on the relevant subjects, so you might not
have the right person there at the right time.
You might try to expand the Congressional Research Service. The
problem is that while you avoid the diversion of resources problem,
you will violate the organization’s norm of nonpartisanship,
something we should value pretty highly. CRS staff members can
provide certain kinds of information, but not political intelligence. As
a legislator, however, you need that kind of information to move
forward.
Finally, as Alex and I propose, you could fund policy research
consultants—the people to provide the McLegislation, the
McResearch and McTalking Points, plus all the politically relevant
advice a congressional representative could possibly want. We
already see a ramshackle version of it happening today. I recently
testified in front of Congress. I was (willingly) being used by
congressional representatives—doing research for them and
providing advice on the bill. That is what all academics do. We are
like unpaid research assistants. That’s the ramshackle version.
Staffers find the experts in the field, and experts submit testimony.
But that isn’t really going to do the trick here. Lobbyists provide
something that is much more far-reaching and much more helpful.
What we have in mind are researchers who have a more permanent
status—people who can provide information during the major stages
of decision-making as well as during the period in which the bill is
amended.
If we imagine a market-based solution for funding the legislative
subsidy—allowing individual members to hire whomever they
want—we would avoid the really hard constitutional question
involved here. Often times there is an impulse among academics and
reformers to want to sort the “good lobbyists” from the “bad
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lobbyists” or the “public interests lobbyists” from the “corporate
lobbyists.” I just don’t think that, as a constitutional matter, that is a
particularly safe thing to do. I’m not even sure if it is the right thing
to do. Our proposal is just to let congressional representatives hire
whomever they want. If they want to hire from the oil industry, they
can hire from the oil industry.
But why would they? The oil industry is already very happy to
provide its own legislative assistance to Congress. In fact, I think oil
executives would far prefer that congressional members consult with
their guys rather than some independent person that congressional
members have hired. We think it is quite likely that congressional
representatives will do what we hope they will do—that they will
look for expertise where it is not being supplied.
As I said, the idea is in the kicking around stage and I would
welcome any solid kicks during the question and answer period. But
before I close, let me link our proposal back to the larger point here.
Citizens United, the decisions that preceded it, and the decisions that
will follow it will block off many of the traditional paths of campaign
finance reform. That means that campaign finance reform needs to
move in new directions—with a greater emphasis placed on leveling
up rather than leveling down, directing money into politically useful
channels instead of attempting to take money out of politics. This will
be particularly true as disclosure and transparency become the
constitutionally safe options for reformers. I think that campaign
finance and lobbying, which have long been connected in practice,
will also grow together in theory and in policy. There has long been a
reason to study the two together. Citizens United simply makes that
fact much more obvious. Thank you very much.
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